

17 October 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:

Special Assistant, Regional Issues Group, SOVA

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SUBJECT: NSC Meeting 18 October 1985

1. You are scheduled to attend an NSC meeting on Friday, 18 October at 1100. The subject will be the MBFR talks in Vienna. Whether the US should adopt a new MBFR proposal is basically a political one. The military/security costs of a token first-phase withdrawal would be low, despite DoD protests. An agreement which included an exchange of information or which gave NATO greater access to Pact units, installations, and training areas would be of benefit to the Intelligence Community.

2. The following information is provided as background:

TAB A - Evaluation of Soviet 14 February 1985 Proposal. Soviets proposed a first-phase reduction of 13,000 US and 20,000 USSR troops in combat military units.

TAB B - Should US support a change from the Western proposal of April 1984? Tab contains an outline of the proposal, its implications, and the full text.

TAB C - MBFR IG Option Paper which contains four options and a "military parameters" paper by JCS.

(1) State Option (same as UK/FRG) - first stage US/USSR withdrawal of 13,000/30,000 troops with data exchanged at end of withdrawals and verified during the next two to three years.

(2) Ambassador Blackwill (USDEL MBFR) Option - same as State/UK/FRG option but proposes reductions of 6,500 US and 15,000 USSR troops.

(3) ACDA Option - develop inspection procedures but testing them on one US and one Soviet garrison.

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(4) OSD Option - shift MBFR from troop reductions to mutual confidence building measures, at least as a first stage.

(5) JCS Military Parameters (Annex A) - opposes reductions. If reductions ordered, opposes limitations on manpower or units.

TAB D - Verification Talking Points. A treaty based on manpower cannot be monitored with confidence. The IC could monitor a treaty based on units, especially large units, without agreed prior data or intrusive verification measures. JCS objects to withdrawing large units.

TAB E - Military Implications Chapter of IG MBFR Study.

- DoD believes any troop reductions would reduce NATO security since the Pact could return withdrawn forces faster than the US could.
- DoD also holds that the Pact could mobilize forces in its western military districts (outside the zone) and NATO would be unable to respond without breaking the treaty.
- IC believes the Pact would most likely mobilize up to 750,000 Soviet and NSWP troops in a gradual buildup before attacking NATO. (NIE 4-1-84)
- The buildup process would be so extensive and time-consuming, lasting up to six months, that the West would have time to train and return withdrawn troops.

No TAB - Negotiability

(1) Options I and II - The Soviets proposed withdrawing 13,000 US and 20,000 USSR troops in their February 1985 proposal.

- They may be willing to change the numbers but not the ratio to the 13,000-30,000 found in Option I and II.
- The East is unlikely to agree to give the West detailed data on its forces "down to battalion level" or to allow NATO to conduct up to 30 ground and aerial inspections per year.

(2) Option III

- The East is unlikely to agree to inspection provisions it has rejected in the past for even one garrison. There is nothing in the proposal of benefit for the East. An agreement would set what they would consider to be an unacceptable precedent.

(3) Option III

- The East would have little motivation to accept a move away from troop reductions to measures which would give the West direct access to its installations and exercises.
- The East has rejected such measures in Vienna and similar measures at the CDE talks in Stockholm.

TAB F - Precedent - deferring data agreement would be a change in Western negotiating positions.

- Would be workable if East agrees to give data and allows data to be checked.
- Possible if East withdraws units not individual troops.

TAB G - Data Estimates - Contains two reports on the 1985 estimate of Warsaw Pact manpower compared to US 1984 estimate and the 1985 estimate.

No TAB - Summary of Key Points.

(1) US agencies and departments are split on MBFR:

- State was directed to support the UK/FRG proposal by Secretary Schultz.
- OSD has taken the position that any troop cuts could endanger Western security.
- DoD has made some heroic assumptions about Pact capabilities.
 - ° Pact reserves could mobilize and fight with no or minimal training.
 - ° Withdrawn Category A divisions would be kept at full-strength in the USSR.

- ° The Pact could mobilize in western military districts and NATO would do nothing.
- ° OSD has used a Rand model we haven't seen as basis of their "analysis."

-- JCS originally supported OSD, but now is neutral and favors no options. The chiefs are basically opposed to any reductions or limitations.

(2) OSD and JCS insist on agreed prior data:

- IC view is that agreed prior data may not be necessary for a limited first-phase reduction.
- If reductions were taken mainly in units (as West proposed in April 1984 and East accepted in February 1985) IC could monitor withdrawal and residual forces with confidence since we have excellent data on unit locations.
- If reductions were taken as individuals, prior data would be needed.
- Part of the DoD motivation, to avoid troop cuts, is to insist on a detailed prior data agreement knowing that the East will not accept such a proposal.

(3) OSD and JCS also insist on intrusive verification measures:

- IC view is that measures should be strong enough to resolve differences between Pact information and Western holdings.
- Insisting on measures which are needlessly intrusive will pre-doom any proposal.

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SECRETMBFR Working Group
March 26, 1985OVERALL EVALUATION OF NEW EASTERN MBFR PROPOSAL

The Eastern proposal of February 14 is in effect a codification, in legally binding form, of their 1983 proposals for initial U.S. and Soviet ground force withdrawals of 13,000 and 20,000 respectively, and a subsequent no-increase commitment by all direct participants. It contains little that is new (indeed, much of the language is drawn directly from their 1982 draft treaty) and, in fact, much of what is new is undesirable from the Western point of view. The most striking aspect of the Eastern proposal is its emphasis on U.S.-Soviet reductions, with a relatively tenuous connection to subsequent reductions to parity by all direct participants.

There are, nevertheless, some positive features to the proposal. These, as well as main negative points, are briefly summarized below. A more detailed evaluation of the Eastern move is contained in the Annex.

Positive features

-- In placing their 1983 proposals for initial U.S.-Soviet reductions and a freeze in binding, treaty-type language, the East has technically been responsive to Western criticism, and has moved toward our position.

-- The East has accepted ground force personnel in "combat military units" as the focus of U.S.-Soviet reductions, and has indicated that this term is essentially the same as the Western term "combat/combat support forces." They have also accepted the Western position that up to 10 percent of these reductions could be taken as individuals.

-- The Eastern proposal incorporates a flank security provision in connection with initial U.S.-Soviet reductions. This had been omitted from the "mutual example proposal" of 1983.

-- Eastern representatives have hinted at flexibility in a number of areas, including the size (though not the ratio) of initial U.S.-Soviet reductions and the need for temporary exceptions to the ceilings.

Negative features

-- The first point above, referring to movement toward the Western position on legally binding agreements, could prove to be a negative feature if Stage 2 reductions are delayed or never agreed to, as the sides would be committed to a legally binding freeze on forces, thereby codifying the

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existing force imbalance (a primary Eastern objective), without agreement on large asymmetrical reductions (the primary Western objective).

-- Apart from the points specified above, the Eastern proposal retains virtually all of the objectionable features which characterized its earlier proposals, including: no provision for an overall prior exchange of data, the ratio of U.S.-Soviet reductions, inadequate verification, and insistence on inclusion of armaments both in reductions and in the freeze.

-- The East has now broadened its no-increase proposal so that it would be on a collective and national basis. This is clearly a step back from their earlier acceptance of the principle of collectivity (subject to their insistence on the "50 percent rule").

-- The provision in the new Eastern draft committing the sides to continue after initial U.S.-Soviet reductions to negotiate "with the object" of reductions to parity is much weaker than the commitment in their 1982 draft treaty. Thus, they are again (as in their 1983 "mutual example" proposal) suggesting what amounts to a decoupling of initial U.S.-Soviet reductions from subsequent reductions to parity by all direct participants. (While the April, 1984 Western proposal also defers commitment to specific reductions by non-U.S./non-Soviet direct participants until after initial U.S.-Soviet reductions and a one year no-increase period, that proposal does provide that data on all combat/combat support forces be agreed to and full U.S.-Soviet reductions would be specified and carried out in any case.)

Ambiguous elements

In explaining their new proposal, Eastern negotiators have emphasized that they have deliberately incorporated ambiguous treatment of the following disagreed, but mainly peripheral issues in order to facilitate a quick agreement: air force subceilings, exceptions to residual force ceilings, limits on exercises, forces in transit, and civilians in military jobs. These issues are all, except for exceptions, elements that the East wants and their willingness to set them aside for now does not mean that they have yielded on these points. Regarding exceptions, there is little likelihood that any agreement without a specific exceptions regime would be acceptable to the West.

It is quite clear that in substantive terms, the new Eastern proposal represents little movement toward the Western position. It should be viewed in the broader context of overall Soviet arms control strategy, especially in relation

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to the recent reopening of the Geneva negotiations and Soviet tabling of a non-use of force treaty in Stockholm. It also represents an effort to put the ball back in the Western court in the Vienna negotiations, where the West has had the latest proposal on the table for nine months.

The issue, then, is not whether the Eastern proposal should be accepted in whole or in part. It is whether the West should take the opportunity, either for broader reasons or in a genuine effort to move the negotiations forward, to revise its own position over the coming weeks. It seems clear that some of our Allies will wish to do so. Other Allies see nothing in the Soviet proposal which warrants re-evaluating the West's current position and would be content with a pro-forma response using the Soviet "rhythm" (nine months).

Amb. Glitman proposed last December that we look at where we wish to go over the longer term and submitted a U.S. MBFR Delegation study for IG consideration. Glitman also suggested that the subsequent U.S. position on a Western response to the next Eastern counter-proposal be based on the results of that look.

We should decide soon whether we wish to take the lead in developing a new NATO proposal, to let others do so, or to insist upon adherence to our current position.

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TAB B

Western 19 April 1984 MBFR Proposal

The 19 April 1984 proposal attempted to get around the data discrepancy problem adopting the following measures:

- Require satisfactory data before a treaty only on combat and combat support forces.
- If the Pact data fell within an acceptable range it would be accepted.
- Called for a first-phase reduction of 13,000 US and 30,000 Soviet troops. These would be taken in combat and combat support forces (90 percent in units, 10 percent as individuals).
- Exchange of data on rear services and air units deferred for one year.
- Enhanced verification package.

The proposal was not accepted by the East.

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-- Tabled own February 1985 response.

Is no longer supported by the majority of the NATO countries.

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Implications of the US Proposal

The US Government's proposal to require data only on combat and combat support (C/CS) forces prior to treaty signature has implications for several key MBFR issues. The most significant of these are:

- Reductions to be specified in the treaty;
- Ceilings and sub-ceiling requirements;
- Treatment of ground combat service support forces;
- Treatment of air forces;
- Non-circumvention;
- Reductions schedule;
- Sequence of events.

Specified Reductions

Under the current Western draft treaty, the East must agree to a specific plan for reductions, including numbers to be reduced, ceilings and sub-ceilings to be reached, and the timing which would apply to both.

If the only satisfactory data exchange required before treaty signature is that pertaining to C/CS forces, reductions and schedules logically would be specified only in terms of these forces. In this case, reductions of other forces necessary to reach the common collective ceiling would not be specified (nor data on those forces agreed to) before treaty signature. Reductions of non-C/CS forces could be implied by the retention of a 700,000 ground force and overall 900,000 man ceiling.

Sub-Ceilings/Ceilings

Under both Eastern and Western draft treaties, each side would be subject to an overall manpower ceiling of 900,000, and a sub-ceiling of 700,000 on ground forces. The West should not lightly abandon this basic point of agreement with the East. Moreover, these ceilings have utility in determining implied reductions for ground combat service support (CSS) and air forces. Determining specific reductions in ground C/CS forces for each side requires establishing a new sub-ceiling pertaining to these forces.

The level of C/CS forces each side should be allowed in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA) must be determined on the basis of agreed definitions and categorization. The precise sub-ceiling is, therefore, somewhat subject to negotiation. Nevertheless, NATO should agree upon its own definitions and categories with which to set an illustrative sub-ceiling.

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A logical starting point for our purposes is to assume that residual common ceilings on C/CS forces should reflect roughly the existing ratio of C/CS to CSS forces. Western intelligence estimates that C/CS forces account for approximately 75% of the total Eastern ground forces (and, by US calculations, for Western forces in the NGA as well).

Thus, in proposing a reductions agreement based on ground C/CS forces, approximately 520,000 would be a logical C/CS sub-ceiling within the agreed 700,000 man ground force ceiling. This would, in turn, be the basis for calculating specific reductions of C/CS forces. If remaining provisions of the Western draft treaty are retained, we would expect additional sub-ceilings on US and Soviet C/CS forces.

Treatment of Ground Combat Service Support (CSS) Forces

As we would no longer require data agreement on ground CSS forces prior to treaty signature, we could not expect to specify the size of reductions. But, retention of the 700,000 ceiling requires that ground CSS forces be accounted for in some way. If we assume that a side does not go below the 520,000 C/CS force sub-ceiling we would require that sides take unspecified (but calculable) reductions in CSS forces so that the ground force total in the NGA would not exceed 700,000 at the end of the reductions period.

We must be reasonably able to ascertain that overall limitations are reached on schedule and maintained for the life of the treaty. A good understanding of C/CS forces would itself add to our understanding of the remaining forces. Realistically, however, the ability to challenge non-compliance requires an exchange of CSS information at some point before the ceiling comes into effect, and some method of differentiating CSS reductions. The other verification measures should be applied to CSS forces from the outset of the treaty to prevent circumvention (see below).

Treatment of Air Forces

The US draft NAC guidance does not address the treatment of air forces. The West has resisted any attempt to place specific reduction requirements or residual ceilings on air forces. The most prudent course at present is to continue including air forces within the overall ceiling, but to otherwise avoid placing specific limitations or reduction requirements on them. Air forces would in effect, be treated in the same manner as ground CSS forces for the purposes of adherence to the overall ceiling and application of verification measures.

The alternative is to advocate subjecting data on air force manpower to the same type of functional disaggregation requirement as we propose for ground forces. At the very least, such an approach is fraught with significantly greater definitional uncertainties--in

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both NATO and the Warsaw Pact--than we already face. In addition, many of the same reasons used thus far to avoid inclusion of specific limits on air forces (easy to move in and out of the area quickly, etc.) hold true as well in this case. Unless and until equipments are included in agreed limits, a specific methodology for the treatment of air forces to the West's advantage remains elusive.

Non-Circumvention

Currently, the Western draft treaty addresses circumvention only in the context of redeploying withdrawn forces to the disadvantage of protocol states. An agreed sub-ceiling on C/CS forces raises the obvious question of the East's hiding such forces among CSS and/or air forces, or conversely, training and equipping substantial elements of CSS/Air manpower to rapidly augment C/CS forces. To be effective, a clause prohibiting any such use of CSS/air forces would have to be agreed by the East, as would the West's right to conduct periodic random inspections of such units to check compliance. In addition, some methodology for checking the agreed categorization of C/CS forces and verifying the entry and exit of those forces would have to be agreed so that C/CS reductions and sub-ceilings could be verified. We would probably have to specify that non-indigenous C/CS reductions would have to be taken in unit configurations and that the preparation of those units designated for departure must be subject to observation. In effect, we would apply verification measures from the outset to the geographic area, not to types of forces.

Reductions Schedule

The current Western schedule calls for a 7 year scheme with alternative years devoted to verification. Focusing specified reductions on ground C/CS forces might allow some compression along the following lines:

- Year 1: US-Soviet reductions of ground C/CS forces of 13,000 and 30,000, respectively;
- Year 2: Reductions by all direct participants to an interim ceiling on ground C/CS forces;
- Year 3: No reductions. Verification of interim ceilings on ground C/CS forces;
- Years 4 and 5: Exchange of information in agreed categories on CSS and air forces to be part of final ceilings and sub-ceilings. Completion of reductions of all forces to parity: 900,000 ceiling on total forces, 700,000 sub-ceiling on total ground forces, 520,000 sub-ceiling on ground C/CS forces.

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If after trilateral discussions further verification time or provisions are believed needed, the above schedule could be modified. The point of course is to move toward the East's position on the period of reductions with no cost to our own security.

Sequence of Events

Summarizing much of the above discussion, but including the negotiation milestones, the points below would be accomplished in the following order:

1. Prior to treaty signature:
 - Agreement on AMs (including format for exchange of data).
 - Data exchanged on C/CS forces and falls within acceptable range.
 - All remaining elements of treaty agreed upon, including specification of reductions by each direct participant.
2. Treaty signature.
3. Treaty comes into effect; all associated measures implemented; US/Soviet reductions begin.
4. End of first year: reductions continue, but non-US/non-Soviet direct participants join the process.
5. End of second year: interim ceilings on ground C/CS forces reached.
6. Third year: no reductions, verification of interim ceilings.
7. Fourth year: information is exchanged on CSS and air forces to be part of final ceilings and sub-ceilings.
8. End of fifth year: overall ceilings and sub-ceilings reached; verification continues for duration of treaty.

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TAGS: MBFR, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES

- AT APRIL 18, 1984 INFORMAL SESSION

1. C-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING ARE THE TALKING POINTS, INCLUDING INITIATIVE AND ATTACHMENTS PASSED TO THE EAST, USED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES IN PRESENTING THE NEW WESTERN MBER INITIATIVE IN THE APRIL 18, 1984 INFORMAL.

BEGIN TEXT:

PAPER 1 (CANADIAN REP)

BACKGROUND TO WESTERN PROPOSAL

1. IN THE MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE ISSUED UPON THE CONCLUSION OF THE DECEMBER 8-9, 1983 MEETING IN BRUSSELS, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS IN THE VIENNA TALKS REAFFIRMED THEIR DETERMINATION TO WORK FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE ISSUES BARRING PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.
2. THEY EXPRESSED THEIR HOPE THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF 1983 INDICATED A NEW WILLINGNESS TO ADDRESS THE LONGSTANDING BASIC ISSUES OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THEY NOTED THAT THEY WERE REVIEWING THE STATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ALSO IN LIGHT OF THESE EASTERN PROPOSALS.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. IN CARRYING OUT THIS REVIEW, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD TO DEAL WITH THE REALITY THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF 1983 DIFFERED IN A NUMBER OF SUBSTANTIAL WAYS FROM THE APPROACH CONTAINED IN THE WEST'S DRAFT TREATY OF JULY 1982, WHICH THE WEST CONTINUES TO BELIEVE PROVIDES A SOUND BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT.

4. AMONG THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS CREATED BY THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WERE:

- -- EASTERN REFUSAL TO COOPERATE IN REACHING PRIOR AGREEMENT ON INITIAL DATA.
- -- THE INADEQUACY OF EASTERN VERIFICATION PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THEIR TIME OF APPLICATION.
- -- THE NATURE OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS, PARTICULARLY THE PROPOSAL THAT EACH SIDE WOULD BE LEFT TO DETERMINE THE OVERALL SIZE OF ITS OWN REDUCTIONS.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND, EASTERN PROPOSALS ALSO CONTAINED CERTAIN POSITIVE FEATURES INCLUDING:

- -- THE ACCEPTANCE OF MEASURES FOR INSPECTION, PERMANENT EXIT/ENTRY POINTS AND A DIS-AGGREGATED EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.
- -- A WILLINGNESS TO AT LEAST SPECIFY THE "BULK" OF REDUCTIONS AND TO PERMIT OBSERVATION OF THESE REDUCTIONS.
- -- AGREEMENT TO ACHIEVE THE AGREED FINAL CEILINGS WITHIN A SPECIFIED TIMEFRAME.

6. IN OUR CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, THE WEST HAS TRIED TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS CITED ABOVE. WE HAVE BUILT UPON THE POSITIVE FEATURES OF EASTERN PROPOSALS AND SET OUT TO MEET EASTERN CONCERNS WHEREVER POSSIBLE IN A MANNER WHICH DOES NOT DIMINISH WESTERN SECURITY INTERESTS.

7. WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED TO PRESENT A MAJOR NEW INITIATIVE AND TO NEGOTIATE TOWARD REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THIS INITIATIVE.

8. WE WILL DEVOTE THREE PRESENTATIONS TO CONVEYING OUR NEW INITIATIVE: THE FIRST TO THE PROPOSAL ITSELF; THE SECOND TO ATTACHMENT A OF THE PROPOSAL; AND THE THIRD TO ATTACHMENT B OF THE PROPOSAL.

9. WE WILL ACCOMPANY THESE PRESENTATIONS WITH A BRIEF IDENTIFICATION OF THE MAIN NEW FEATURES OF THESE PAPERS.

10. FOLLOWING THESE THREE PRESENTATIONS, WE SHALL EXPLAIN IN DETAIL HOW THIS NEW WESTERN INITIATIVE DEALS

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TAGS: MBER, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES WITH THE BASIC ISSUES BLOCKING PROGRESS.

11. WE WILL, OF COURSE, TABLE THIS INITIATIVE OFFICIALLY AT OUR NEXT PLENARY SESSION.

PAPER 2 (U.S. REP)

PRESENTATION OF THE WESTERN INITIATIVE

1. I WILL NOW HAND OVER THE TEXT OF THE COMPLETE WESTERN INITIATIVE. (WESTERN REPRESENTATIVE THEN PROVIDES EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES WITH ATTACHED TEXTS AND GIVES THE EAST READING TIME.)

2. NOW LET ME IDENTIFY THE MAJOR FEATURES OF THE NEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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WESTERN APPROACH.

3. FIRST OF ALL, YOU WILL NOTE THAT OUR NEW APPROACH HAS SUBSTANTIALLY ALTERED OUR POSITION ON THE DATA PROBLEM. WE HAVE MODIFIED THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT FOR AGREEMENT ON INITIAL DATA ON ALL FORCES IN THE AREA PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE.

4. DATA EXCHANGE WILL BE REQUIRED ONLY ON GROUND COMBAT AND GROUND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN A FORMAT TO BE AGREED.

5. ALSO, WE REQUIRE ONLY THAT THE EXCHANGE OF DATA BE SUFFICIENT TO FALL WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE RANGE OF ESTIMATES.

6. WITH REGARD TO THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION PROCESS, OUR NEW APPROACH EMBODIES THE FOLLOWING NEW FEATURES:

- -- SPECIFICATION OF US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS IS REQUIRED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE PROCESS BUT IN COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES ONLY;
- -- US-SOVIET COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES REDUCTIONS ARE TO BE TAKEN IN UNIT CONFIGURATIONS TO BE DECIDED BY THE REDUCING SIDE WITH UP TO 10 PERCENT IN INDIVIDUALS;
- -- INTERIM SUB-CEILINGS ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED ON US-SOVIET COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES, BUT UPON REACHING FINAL CEILINGS THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION WOULD BE FREE TO MIX COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES UNDER THEIR OVERALL INDIVIDUAL CEILINGS;
- -- US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS TO THE SPECIFIED INTERIM SUB-CEILINGS ON COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES AND TO THE FINAL US-SOVIET CEILINGS ARE TO TAKE PLACE ACCORDING TO A FIXED TIMETABLE EVEN IF NO AGREEMENT IS SUBSEQUENTLY REACHED IN SPECIFYING THE REDUCTIONS OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS.
- -- A COLLECTIVE NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT COVERING THE GROUND FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA WOULD COME INTO EFFECT UPON COMPLETION OF INITIAL US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS;
- -- REDUCTION AMOUNTS FOR ALL GROUND FORCES OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT GROUND FORCES OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION WILL NOT BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. RATHER, THEY WOULD BE DETERMINED FOLLOWING EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN THE SECOND YEAR OF THE TREATY AND THE VERIFICATION OF THAT INFORMATION DURING THAT SAME YEAR.
- -- THESE REDUCTIONS WILL BE TAKEN ON A COLLECTIVE BASIS IN TWO STAGES TO THE AGREED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING OF 900,000, INCLUDING 700,000 GROUND FORCES PERSONNEL. NON-U.S. AND NON-SOVIET PARTICIPANTS WILL TAKE THEIR REDUCTIONS COLLECTIVELY AS THEY THEMSELVES DETERMINE. THE CHARACTER AND FORM OF U.S. AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A PRECEDENT FOR REDUCTIONS BY OTHERS.
- -- THE TIMETABLE FOR REDUCTIONS TO PARITY IS REDUCED FROM SEVEN YEARS TO FIVE YEARS.

7. THE FOREGOING WOULD GO HAND IN HAND WITH EASTERN

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES
WILLINGNESS TO MEET WESTERN VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.

8. THESE, THEN, ARE THE MAJOR NEW ELEMENTS IN OUR NEW
PROPOSAL. ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE WESTERN DRAFT
AGREEMENT OF JULY 8, 1982 REMAIN UNCHANGED.

9. MY COLLEAGUES WILL NOW DISCUSS ATTACHMENTS A AND B
TO OUR PROPOSAL.

PAPER 3 (FRG REP)

- PRESENTATION OF ATTACHMENT A

1. I WOULD NOW LIKE TO ADDRESS ATTACHMENT A OF THE NEW
WESTERN PROPOSAL.

2. ATTACHMENT A IDENTIFIES CATEGORIES UNDER WHICH
GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA COULD BE IDENTIFIED FOR THE
PURPOSES OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

3. THESE CATEGORIES WOULD ENCOMPASS ALL PERSONNEL WHICH
ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERED BY THE WEST AS BEING SUBJECT TO
A REDUCTION AND LIMITATION AGREEMENT. THESE CATEGORIES
WOULD HAVE TO BE AGREED UPON PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE.

4. THIS LIST OF CATEGORIES COMPRISES THE FORMAT DESIGNED
TO SERVE AS THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AND TO HELP THE
SIDES IN THE NECESSARY TASK OF DEFINING WHAT FORCES
WOULD BE INCLUDED UNDER THE COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT
HEADING AND WHICH FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED UNDER THE
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT HEADING. THIS LIST WOULD ALSO
BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSING THE COUNTING RULES
TO BE APPLIED.

5. ATTACHMENT A SHOWS HOW WE WOULD PROPOSE TO GROUP
FORCES UNDER THE TWO MAJOR HEADINGS OF, FIRST, COMBAT
AND COMBAT SUPPORT (WHICH FOR CONVENIENCE WE REFER TO
AS C/CS FORCES) AND, SECOND, COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES
(WHICH, FOR CONVENIENCE, WE REFER TO AS CSS FORCES).

6. WE WOULD NOTE THAT THE GROUPING IS SIMILAR TO ONE
WHICH THE EAST ITSELF SUGGESTED ON MARCH 4, 1976 FOR
PURPOSES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

7. AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED, THE FIRST THREE CATEGORIES
INCLUDE ALL PERSONNEL IN GROUND FORCE DIVISIONS.

8. THIS IS AN OBVIOUS REQUIREMENT SINCE A DIVISION IS AN
INTEGRATED COMBINED ARMS TEAM, ALL ELEMENTS OF WHICH PLAY
A DIRECT ROLE IN ACCOMPLISHING THE DIVISION'S COMBAT
MISSION.

9. AS FOR THE NEXT EIGHT CATEGORIES, THEY COVER PERSONNEL
IN NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS WHICH CLEARLY PLAY A COMBAT AND
COMBAT SUPPORT ROLE.

10. WE EMPHASIZE THAT THE WEST IS NOT REQUIRING AN
EXCHANGE OF DATA IN ALL OF THE CATEGORIES INCLUDED IN
THE LIST.

11. DATA WOULD BE EXCHANGED ONLY IN THOSE FORCES MUTUALLY
AGREED WITH THE EAST AS INCLUDING ALL COMBAT AND COMBAT
SUPPORT PERSONNEL. I WANT TO STRESS MUTUALLY AGREED.

12. NO DATA WOULD BE EXCHANGED PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE
ON COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FORCES.

13. MY WESTERN COLLEAGUE WILL NOW DISCUSS ATTACHMENT B
TO OUR PROPOSAL.

PAPER 4 (CANADIAN REP)

- PRESENTATION OF ATTACHMENT B

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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1. I WOULD NOW LIKE TO ADDRESS ATTACHMENT B TO OUR PROPOSAL.
 2. THE ABSENCE OF FULL PRIOR AGREEMENT ON INITIAL DATA ON ALL FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA, AS CALLED FOR IN OUR NEW APPROACH, HIGHLIGHTS THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION.
 3. GIVEN THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE TO EACH SIDE OF THE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: MBFR, NATO, PARM
SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES EFFECTIVE MONITORING OF COMPLIANCE WITH PROVISIONS OF AN AGREEMENT, THESE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS ARE REASONABLE AND THEY ARE BASED FIRMLY ON THE PRINCIPLE OF RECIPROCITY.
 4. ATTACHMENT B INCORPORATES UNDER ASSOCIATED MEASURE 5 THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF ITS "APPROXIMATE PLANS" PROPOSAL THAT EACH SIDE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO OBSERVE REDUCTIONS.
 5. OUR DESCRIPTION OF THE INFORMATION EXCHANGE MEASURE HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR FURTHER DISAGGREGATION UNDER ATTACHMENT A FOR THE EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION AFTER TREATY SIGNATURE TO HELP VERIFY THE AGREEMENT.
 6. WE SHOULD LIKE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ATTACHMENT B IS ONLY AN OUTLINE OF THE MODIFICATIONS TO OUR VERIFICATION MEASURES.
 7. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE WEST WILL BE PRESENTING SPECIFIC MEASURES SOON IN THE FORM OF AN INTEGRATED WHOLE.
 8. MY COLLEAGUE WILL NOW DISCUSS THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OUR NEW APPROACH.
- PAPER 5 (US REF)

- MERITS OF PROPOSAL -

1. THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL REFLECTS THE DETERMINATION OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO RESOLVE MAJOR ISSUES BLOCKING PROGRESS HERE.
2. THE MOST CRITICAL PROBLEM--AND THE MOST DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE--LIES IN THE EAST'S REFUSAL TO COOPERATE IN REACHING PRIOR AGREEMENT ON INITIAL DATA, INSISTING EITHER THAT SUCH DATA BE SET ASIDE OR THAT AGREEMENT BE BASED ON THE EAST'S OFFICIAL FIGURES ALREADY TABLED.
3. UNDER ITS NEW PROPOSAL, THE WEST HAS SUBSTANTIALLY ALTERED ITS DATA POSITION.
4. THIS NEW APPROACH DIFFERS SIGNIFICANTLY FROM EARLIER PROPOSALS. IT SEEKS TO AVOID THE UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS OF THE PAST AND ATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE DATA QUESTION.
5. IT DOES THIS BY:
 - A. FIRST, REQUIRING AN INITIAL EXCHANGE OF DATA ON ONLY A PORTION OF THE FORCES.
 - B. SECOND, ALSO REQUIRING ONLY THAT EASTERN FIGURES ON THESE FORCES FALL WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE RANGE OF WESTERN ESTIMATES.
 - C. THIRD, EXCLUDING FROM INITIAL DATA EXCHANGE CATEGORIES OF EASTERN FORCES IN WHICH, IN THE WESTERN VIEW, MUCH OF THE DISCREPANCY HAS LAIN.
 - D. FOURTH, PROVIDING FOR A DEFINITIONAL AGREEMENT BEFORE ANY DATA IS EXCHANGED WHICH COULD RESOLVE PREVIOUS AMBIGUITIES REGARDING COUNTING RULES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO EARLIER DISAGREEMENT AND THUS

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- INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF A SUCCESSFUL DATA
- EXCHANGE.
- F. FIFTH, PROVIDING THE SIDES WITH THE
- OPPORTUNITY TO TABLE FIGURES IN A WHOLLY
- REVISED FORMAT, WITH NO DIRECT CONNECTION
- BETWEEN FIGURES TABLED UNDER THIS NEW APPROACH
- AND THOSE TABLED EARLIER IN THE NEGOTIATIONS
- IN A DIFFERENT FORMAT.

6. IN THESE WAYS, THIS NEW WESTERN APPROACH SHOULD FACILITATE A SUCCESSFUL DATA EXCHANGE.

PAPER 6 (FRG REP)

- MERITS OF WESTERN PROPOSAL - CONTINUED

1. IN ITS NEW APPROACH, THE WEST HAS ACCEPTED THE BASIC PATTERN FOR REDUCTIONS PROPOSED IN THE EAST'S FEBRUARY 1983 PROPOSAL, I.E., INITIAL US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS, FOLLOWED BY A FREEZE, FOLLOWED BY REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO AGREED FINAL CEILINGS.

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TAGS: MBFR, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES

2. THE WEST HAS ALSO MOVED TOWARDS THE EASTERN CONCEPT OF A SHORTER REDUCTION PERIOD BY CALLING FOR COMPLETION OF THE REDUCTIONS IN FIVE YEARS.

3. TO MEET A MAJOR EASTERN CONCERN, THE WEST IS NOW PROPOSING A CONTRACTUALLY-BINDING NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WHICH WOULD GO INTO EFFECT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF INITIAL US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS.

4. THIS GOES BEYOND THE EAST'S OWN PROPOSAL IN FEBRUARY 1983 THAT THIS COMMITMENT BE ONLY OF A POLITICAL NATURE.

5. ANOTHER ISSUE IN THESE TALKS HAS BEEN THE FACT THAT, ALTHOUGH THE EAST HAS INDICATED A WILLINGNESS TO SPECIFY THE BULK OF ITS REDUCTIONS IN ADVANCE, EACH SIDE WOULD STILL BE LEFT TO DETERMINE THE OVERALL SIZE OF ITS OWN REDUCTIONS.

6. WE HAVE ACCOMMODATED THIS EASTERN CONCEPT BY INCORPORATING IT BASICALLY IN THE NEW WESTERN APPROACH TO US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS. WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT ONLY US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY, THEREBY NOT REQUIRING THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION TO SPECIFY THEIR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT REDUCTIONS. NO OTHER REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY.

7. FOR 11 YEARS, A PRINCIPLE OF THE WESTERN POSITION HAS BEEN THAT U.S. AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE TAKEN IN DIFFERENT FORMS. IN ITS 1983 PROPOSALS, THE EAST CALLED FOR EACH SIDE TO SET THE FORM OF ITS OWN REDUCTIONS AND THUS REJECTED THIS PRINCIPLE.

8. IN OUR NEW PROPOSAL, THE WEST HAS NOW ALSO ACCOMMODATED THE EAST IN THE FORM OF U.S. AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS BY GIVING UP THIS LONG-HELD REQUIREMENT FOR A DIFFERENT FORM OF REDUCTIONS. THE WEST HAS ALSO MOVED TOWARD THE EASTERN POSITION BY:

- -- DROPPING ITS REQUIREMENT FOR REDUCTIONS BY
- INDIVIDUALS FROM ONE-THIRD TO 10 PERCENT OF
- U.S. FORCES, AND
- -- OFFERING THE USSR THE ABILITY ALSO TO WITHDRAW

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MS... 10 PERCENT OF ITS MILITARY MANPOWER AS
INDIVIDUALS.

9. TAKEN TOGETHER, THESE STEPS AMOUNT TO A FORTHCOMING WESTERN INITIATIVE INVOLVING MAJOR CHANGES IN THE WESTERN POSITION.

10. OUR PROPOSAL IS BASED FULLY ON RECIPROCITY, WITH NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES FOR EITHER SIDE.

11. THIS WESTERN INITIATIVE IS SUBMITTED AS THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREEMENT TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK IN THE TALKS AND OFFER A REAL WAY OUT OF THE DATA IMPASSE.

12. THE WEST IS NOT TABLING THESE PROPOSALS ON A TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT BASIS. WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANY ASPECT OF OUR INITIATIVE, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS WHICH THE EAST MAY HAVE ON IT.

13. WE WOULD ALSO WELCOME YOUR CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS.

APRIL 19, 1984 WESTERN INITIATIVE

1. THE WEST WOULD BE PREPARED TO INTRODUCE A MEASURE OF FLEXIBILITY IN ITS REQUIREMENT FOR A PRIOR FORMAL AGREEMENT ON DATA, BY REQUIRING ONLY THAT THERE BE AN EXCHANGE OF DATA, IN A FORMAT TO BE AGREED, SUFFICIENT TO FALL WITHIN AN ACCEPTABLE RANGE OF WESTERN DATA ESTIMATES AND BY REQUIRING SUCH DATA ONLY ON GROUND COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE. THIS OFFER WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON NEW AND SIGNIFICANT FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE EAST IN MEETING WESTERN VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT FORCE STRENGTHS ARE EFFECTIVELY CLARIFIED, REDUCTIONS ARE TAKEN AND RESIDUAL CEILINGS OBSERVED.

2. THE FORMAT AND MODALITIES OF THE DATA EXCHANGE WHICH WOULD SUBSTITUTE FOR PRIOR FORMAL AGREEMENT ON DATA, AS E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MBFR, NATO, PAPM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE WOULD BE AS SET FORTH IN ATTACHMENT A. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FORMAT AND MODALITIES FOR THE DATA EXCHANGE, AND THE DEFINITIONS AND COUNTING RULES TO BE APPLIED TO COMBAT (C), COMBAT SUPPORT (CS) AND COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT (CSS) FORCES. THE TREATY WOULD BE SIGNED FOLLOWING AGREEMENT ON THE VERIFICATION MEASURES AND DETERMINATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE DATA EXCHANGE. THE TREATY WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE, INTER ALIA:

(A) SPECIFICATION OF US/SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF C/CS FORCES AND INTERIM C/CS SUBCEILINGS FOR US/SOVIET FORCES ONLY;

(B) SPECIFICATION OF FINAL CEILINGS ON US/SOVIET TOTAL GROUND FORCES (I.E., C/CS AND CSS COMBINED); AND

(C) REQUIREMENT THAT THE US/SOVIET REDUCTIONS TO THE SPECIFIED INTERIM SUBCEILINGS ON C/CS FORCES AND TO THE FINAL US/SOVIET CEILINGS TAKE PLACE ACCORDING TO A FIXED TIMETABLE EVEN IF NO AGREEMENT IS SUBSEQUENTLY REACHED ON SPECIFYING THE REDUCTIONS OF THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS.

3. FOLLOWING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY, INITIAL U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS OF 13,000 AND 30,000 RESPECTIVELY WOULD BE TAKEN IN COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN UNIT CONFIGURATIONS WITH UP TO TEN PERCENT AS

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REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN INTERIM
REDUCTIONS ON THE LEVELS OF U.S. AND SOVIET GROUND COMBAT
AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

4. U.S. AND SOVIET PHASE ONE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE FOLLOWED
BY A SECOND PHASE DEVOTED TO CLARIFYING, WITH THE HELP OF
COOPERATIVE MEASURES OF VERIFICATION, THE COLLECTIVE
STRENGTH OF OVERALL FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS
IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. AS AN OBVIOUS COROLLARY, ALL
DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, ON A COLLECTIVE BASIS BUT SUBJECT TO
U.S. AND SOVIET SUBCEILINGS FOR COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT
FORCES, WOULD NOT INCREASE THE OVERALL PERSONNEL STRENGTH
OF GROUND FORCES DURING THIS PHASE. (THIS WOULD NOT
PREVENT AN INCREASE IN FORCE LEVELS FOR INDIVIDUAL UNITS
IF, THROUGH COMPENSATION IN OTHER UNITS, THE OVERALL
CEILINGS WERE NOT EXCEEDED.)

5. THE SIZE AND TIMETABLE OF FURTHER REDUCTIONS OF
COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES BY THE U.S. AND THE
SOVIET UNION WOULD BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY. THESE
REDUCTIONS, WHICH WOULD ALSO BE IN UNITS WITH UP TO 10
PERCENT IN INDIVIDUALS, WOULD LEAD TO INTERIM
SUBCEILINGS ON THE LEVELS OF U.S. AND SOVIET COMBAT AND
COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA TO BE DETER-
MINED. THESE INTERIM SUBCEILINGS WOULD BE IN EFFECT
UNTIL COMPLETION OF ALL SPECIFIED WITHDRAWALS AND
SATISFACTORY VERIFICATION THEREOF. IN ADDITION, THE
LEVEL OF THE SOVIET AND THE U.S. PERMANENT CEILINGS TO BE
REACHED AT THE COMPLETION OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE SPECI-
FIED IN THE TREATY.

6. REDUCTIONS BY ALL OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE
DETERMINED FOLLOWING THE PHASE TWO VERIFICATION OF THE
COLLECTIVE STRENGTH OF OVERALL FORCES OF ALL DIRECT
PARTICIPANTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

7. TO ENSURE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE CEILINGS AND
INTERIM SUBCEILINGS ON THEIR C/CS FORCES, THE U.S. AND
SOVIET UNION WOULD BE PROHIBITED FROM TRAINING AND
EQUIPPING FOR GROUND COMBAT SUPPORT ROLES THOSE COMBAT
SERVICE SUPPORT OR OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE AREA. THESE
PROVISIONS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION.

8. THE WESTERN DRAFT TREATY OF JULY 1982 CALLS FOR A
SEVEN-YEAR REDUCTIONS SCHEME WITH ALTERNATE YEARS DEVOTED
TO VERIFICATION. THE NEW WESTERN APPROACH MIGHT ALLOW
SOME COMPRESSION ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES.

- YEAR 1: US/SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF GROUND C/CS FORCES
OF 13,000 AND 30,000 RESPECTIVELY IN UNITS WITH UP TO 10
PERCENT AS INDIVIDUALS;

- YEAR 2: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION IN AN AGREED FORMAT
ON THE FORCES OF ALL SIDES (ASSOCIATED MEASURE 6),
COMMITMENT NOT TO INCREASE THE OVERALL LEVEL OF GROUND
FORCES DURING THIS PERIOD, VERIFICATION OF FORCE
STRENGTH BY COOPERATIVE MEASURES, AND DETERMINATION OF THE

F.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MBRF, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES
SIZE OF REDUCTIONS ON EACH SIDE REQUIRED TO REACH PARITY
AT COLLECTIVE LEVELS OF 900,000 GROUND AND AIR FORCES
COMBINED AND 700,000 GROUND FORCES;

- YEAR 3: REDUCTIONS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO
AGREED COLLECTIVE INTERIM CEILINGS INCLUDING US/SOVIET

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SUBCEILINGS INCORPORATING APPROPRIATE C/CS SUBCEILINGS.

- YEAR 4: VERIFICATION OF AGREED INTERIM CEILINGS; AND
 - YEAR 5: COMPLETION OF REDUCTIONS OF ALL FORCES TO THE COMBINED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING AT 900,000 FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCES, AND TO THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING AT 700,000 FOR GROUND FORCES AND VERIFICATION OF RESIDUAL CEILINGS, CEILINGS ON THE OVERALL FORCES OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION, COMPLETION OF U.S. AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS OF C/CS FORCES TO AGREED LEVELS (TO BE SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY). (ONCE THE LATTER LEVELS WERE ACHIEVED AND VERIFIED, THEY WOULD CEASE TO BE IN FORCE, THE U.S. AND SOVIET UNION BEING FREE TO CHANGE THE BALANCE BETWEEN C/CS AND OTHER FORCES AS LONG AS THEIR RESPECTIVE CEILINGS WERE NOT EXCEEDED.)

9. TO ENSURE THAT AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE FULLY VERIFIABLE UNDER THESE MODIFIED DATA CONDITIONS, THE PARTIES WILL NEED TO AGREE PRIOR TO TREATY SIGNATURE TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE EXISTING WESTERN ASSOCIATED MEASURES PROPOSALS, ALL OF WHICH WILL BE RETAINED. ATTACHMENT B REPRESENTS ONLY AN INDICATION OF THE ENHANCEMENTS WHICH THE WEST WILL REQUIRE.

10. ALL ASSOCIATED MEASURES, INCLUDING APPLICATION OF ASSOCIATED MEASURES 1 AND 2 TO A WIDER AREA, WILL COME INTO EFFECT UPON ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE TREATY.

11. ALL OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE WESTERN DRAFT TREATY OF JULY 1982 REMAIN UNCHANGED.

ATTACHMENT A

I. COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT FORCES

- PERSONNEL IN DIVISIONS

- PERSONNEL IN TANK DIVISIONS
- PERSONNEL IN MOTORIZED RIFLE/MECHANIZED INFANTRY DIVISIONS
- PERSONNEL IN OTHER DIVISIONS

- NON-DIVISIONAL PERSONNEL

- MOTORIZED RIFLE/MECHANIZED INFANTRY/AIR MOBILE

- TANK
- ROCKET/ARTILLERY
- AIR DEFENSE
- SIGNAL UNITS
- COMBAT HELICOPTERS
- ENGINEER
- ALL OTHER PERSONNEL IN COMBAT/COMBAT SUPPORT UNITS NOT INCLUDED IN THE ABOVE CATEGORIES

ATTACHMENT A

-2-

II. SERVICE SUPPORT

- TRANSPORTATION
- TRAINING
- SUPPLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MBR, NATO, PARM

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS USED BY WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES

- MAINTENANCE
- MEDICAL

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CONSCRIPTION/MOBILIZATION STAFFS
MAJOR HEADQUARTERS
ALL PERSONNEL NOT IN THE ABOVE CATEGORIES
ATTACHMENT B

- WESTERN FLEXIBILITY ON THE REQUIREMENT FOR A PRIOR
AGREEMENT ON DATA MUST BE MATCHED BY EASTERN AGREEMENT TO
ENHANCEMENT OF THE EXISTING WESTERN ASSOCIATED MEASURES
PROPOSALS, ALL OF WHICH WILL BE RETAINED. IN OUTLINE, THE
MAIN ENHANCEMENTS ARE:

- -- ASSOCIATED MEASURE 4 - INSPECTIONS:

- THE WEST WILL PROPOSE ENHANCED PROVISIONS
REGARDING INSPECTIONS, E.G., CONCERNING THEIR
NUMBER, THEIR DURATION, THEIR AREA AND THE
SIZE OF INSPECTION TEAMS.

- -- ASSOCIATED MEASURE 5 - DECLARED ENTRY AND

EXIT POINTS WITH OBSERVERS:

- IN ADDITION TO THE OBSERVERS AT ENTRY AND
EXIT POINTS, PROVISION WILL BE MADE FOR
SEPARATE OBSERVATION TEAMS TO MONITOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS WITHIN THE AREA
OF REDUCTIONS.

- -- ASSOCIATED MEASURE 6 - EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION:

- TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT,
A SIGNIFICANT ENHANCEMENT OF THE DISAGGREGA-
TION OF DATA WILL BE REQUIRED.

END TEXT. ABRAMOWITZ

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